This paper studies the role of imperfect information in explaining market price dispersion. We present a model of endogenous search to emphasize the need for an alternative to the common tests used to identify consumer search. Using a new panel dataset on the U.S. retail gasoline industry, we establish the importance of consumer search with a simple and novel test of temporal price dispersion involving price-rank changes. Additionally, our empirical results on the relationship between price dispersion and key variables are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
Introduction
Retail markets generally exhibit price dispersion regardless of the attributes of the products transacted. Establishing conditions under which …rms will choose to set a range of prices has been a central and classic question in price theory. Beginning with Stigler (1961) , the literature has acknowledged the role of imperfect information in generating equilibrium price dispersion. This literature on search posits that markets consist of consumers who acquire information by actively searching for lower prices, as well as consumers who remain uninformed as they prefer to avoid search costs. This behavior is what allows some …rms to set higher prices than others in equilibrium, even when all …rms sell a homogenous good and have identical production costs. 1 We thank Jim Brander, Keith Head, Thomas Hellman, Dan Ackerberg, Hal White, Tim Hannan and various seminar and conference participants for their comments and suggestions.
y Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia. Contact: ambarish.chandra@sauder.ubc.ca and mariano.tappata@sauder.ubc.ca 1 See Stahl (1996) and Baye et al. (2006) for a comprehensive literature review on consumer search theory.
Establishing evidence of consumer search has been challenging. Empirical studies have mostly relied on a single comparative static to identify the role of search in a given market.
Some studies regress price dispersion on proxies of search costs or proxies of search bene…ts; others regress price dispersion on the number of …rms in the market. 2 However, a drawback of these tests is that the relationships tested are not monotone, as we show in the next section, and so, in principle, any result is consistent with search. For example, the theoretical relationship between search intensity and price dispersion is non-monotonic; yet it has usually been assumed to be negative and results that …nd a negative relationship are taken as validation of the role of search. A better test of consumer search comes from temporal price dispersion, i.e. changes in the rankings of …rms'prices over time. Many prior studies do suggest the existence of temporal price dispersion with transition matrices that show prices jumping from one quartile of the distribution to another over time. 3 However, no formal test is provided. Moreover, temporal price dispersion can also be generated in a product di¤erentiation environment with idiosyncratic demand or cost shocks; the studies mentioned above do not have a control group or benchmark with which to compare the observed temporal price dispersion. 4 To address these issues we propose a simple yet powerful test of imperfect information in the gasoline industry, comparing the temporal price dispersion between stations for which consumer search may possibly play a role, to a control group of stations where imperfect information is absent. In this way we can identify the role of search without making assumptions on the relation between search and price dispersion or other comparative statics.
We study temporal price dispersion with a new and extremely rich panel dataset, providing daily retail prices for US gasoline stations. This dataset allows us to test a broad range of predictions from a model of price dispersion with endogenous consumer search. We use this model to emphasize how key variables do not necessarily have a monotonic e¤ect on price dispersion and average posted prices; something that has either not been well understood or made explicit in previous studies. 5 There is a large empirical literature that links price dispersion with consumer search behavior in many industries. Van Hoomissen (1988) …nds that -consistent with costly search and repeated purchases -price dispersion and in ‡ation are positively related. Higher in ‡ation reduces the incentives to search since information depreciates at a higher rate.
2 See, respectively, Dahlby and West (1986) and Brown and Goolsbee (2002) ; Sorensen (2000) and Van Hoomissen (1988) ; and Barron et al (2004) . 3 See, for example, Lach (2002) . 4 These issues are exacerbated due to the absence in the literature of a general theoretical framework which incorporates the interaction of product di¤erentiation and imperfect information. We return to this point in Section 4. 5 One exception is Brown and Goolsbee (2002) . Sorensen (2000) follows a similar approach although the identi…cation comes from comparing price dispersion across products rather than across time. The main …nding is that the price dispersion for a prescription drug is negatively correlated with its associated frequency of
use. An alternative approach is to focus on the relationship between price dispersion and consumers' search cost. Dahlby and West (1986) show that car insurance premiums are less dispersed for the class of drivers that are associated with lower search costs. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) use a structural model to estimate the search cost distribution in the S&P500 index fund market. They …nd that the increase in fees and dispersion during the late 1990s is explained by the entry of novice investors (with higher search costs) to the market. 6 Brown and Goolsbee (2002) show how the reduction in searching costs due to the introduction of the Internet made the life insurance market more competitive. 7
The gasoline market is an appealing industry in which to study the role of search for two main reasons. 8 First, the phenomenon of gas stations prominently displaying their prices allows us to use a simple test involving price rankings that controls for imperfect information.
In particular, we …nd that the dispersion over time is signi…cantly lower for stations located at the same street intersection than for stations further apart although still in the same local market. This is consistent with the predictions of search models since, for stations in the same intersection, di¤erences in prices are driven only by product characteristics and not by imperfect information. Second, since gas stations sell more than one fuel-type we can compare price dispersion across products with varying search costs, but in the same market.
This allows us to pin down the equilibrium relationship between price dispersion and search intensity which, in theory, is non-monotonic and therefore hard to estimate. There are other reasons that make the gasoline market appropriate for empirical research in this area, essentially due to the …t between industry characteristics and the assumptions of consumer search theories : i) demand is inelastic in the short run and similar across consumers, ii) stockpiling is not a feasible option, iii) …rms face a fairly homogeneous marginal cost, and iv) have no capacity constraints. 9
In addition to the contributions to the literature on search and price dispersion, our 6 Both Dahlby and West (1986) , and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) assume a model where the price dispersion is generated by the combination of production cost dispersion and costly consumer search (Carlson and McAfee, 1983) . While this is a reasonable assumption for the industries analyzed, it is important to note that identifying consumer search as responsible for price dispersion is a more di¢ cult task given that the theory predicts no temporal dispersion. 7 Other studies of online markets include Clay et al. (2001) , Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) and Baye et al. (2004) .
8 This is also an important industry for economic reasons. Gasoline retailing is a large and growing sector within the U.S. economy. According to the Census Bureau, retail sales of gasoline reached $241.9 billion in 2002 (www.census.gov). Additionally, gasoline's share of total consumer expenditures rose by 43% to 4.3% between 2002 and 2005 (www.bls.gov/cex/) . 9 See Borenstein et al. (1997, p. 328) and Noel (2007, p. 88). paper also adds to the empirical literature on price dispersion in gasoline industries. 10 We employ new data which provide key advantages over prior datasets. First, we have daily data on gasoline prices; this is important since existing studies rely on weekly observations, which are not ideal for a study of temporal price dispersion. Second, we have data on most stations in 4 large states, thereby employing more representative data than samples from a single city or region. Our data cover all grades of gasoline and span over 18 months during which there were large changes in the wholesale price of gasoline. This allows us to test relationships, such as between price dispersion and production costs and search costs, that have not been examined thus far.
Our results regarding the relationships between price dispersion on the one hand, and the number of …rms, search costs and production costs are as expected. Fuel-types associated with higher consumer search cost exhibit higher equilibrium levels of price dispersion, suggesting relatively high levels of search intensity (low information rents). Markets with more …rms show greater price dispersion and higher average markups. Interestingly, we …nd that consumers should search less when pump prices increase as a result of shocks to the wholesale price. A spike in the oil price that translates into a 10 cent increase in retail prices is associated with up to a 4 cent reduction in the market price dispersion for Regular Unleaded. Our results are strengthened when we use as the dependent variable the price dispersion that remains after controlling for sellers'observed and unobserved characteristics.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple model of consumer search and summarize its main empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the industry and the data. We then move on to our empirical exercises in two parts. In Section 4 we analyze temporal price dispersion and establish the importance of consumer search in the gasoline market. Then in Section 5, having a¢ rmed the role of search in generating price dispersion, we estimate the equilibrium relationships between key variables and compare them to the predictions of our model of search. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical framework
The objective of this section is to discuss the intuition behind a simple consumer search model. We do not attempt to model the gasoline industry; rather, our goal is to establish the equilibrium properties of a general model of search. The main message is that many of the comparative statics from models with a …xed search intensity change and become non-monotonic once we allow for endogenous search. This suggests that rather than relying 1 0 See, for example, Barron et al (2004) , Hosken et al (2008) , Lewis (2008) and Lach and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009). on testing comparative statics, the importance of consumer search should be inferred from more general results, such as temporal price dispersion, that characterize search models.
The literature on consumer search has grown substantially since Stigler's (1961) seminal work on imperfect information. His basic theory has been re…ned and extended in many directions although its main result still prevails: price dispersion is a natural outcome in markets where consumers have imperfect information. The intuition is that when prices are not freely observed, some consumers decide to search while others choose to remain uninformed. Given this behavior, a …rm can set a high price and sell to a fraction of uninformed consumers or have a sale and increase the probability of higher demand by the mass of informed consumers. In equilibrium, the …rms are indi¤erent between a broad range of prices and the law of one price vanishes.
Price dispersion is the outcome of search models irrespective of the search protocol assumed for consumers. There are two main protocols used in the literature: nonsequential search (Varian, 1980) and sequential search (Stahl, 1989) . The former occurs when a consumer decides between shopping from the store with the lowest price (at cost s) and shopping from a random store. The latter protocol implies that a consumer observes a price (at no cost) and then decides between searching for a lower price (at cost s) or buying at the minimum observed price. 11 The optimality of each search protocol depends on the characteristics of the market analyzed and the search technology available to consumers (Morgan and Manning, 1985) .
Retail gasoline demand can be characterized as having two basic types of consumers: we refer to these as (a) commuters and (b) occasional drivers or tourists. The …rst group can be thought of as consumers who search nonsequentially since observing all the price quotes on the way to work (home) and buying gasoline from the cheapest station when driving in the opposite direction seems a reasonable strategy. By contrast, drivers that do not have an established route ex-ante (tourists) might …nd sequential search to be optimal. 12 We believe that the demand for gasoline is composed mainly of the …rst type, hence we concentrate on 1 1 Most of the search protocols analyzed in the literature are variations of these two. For example, Dana (1994) assumes that a consumer …rst observes a price for free and decides if it is worth paying s to observe the remaining n 1 prices. Burdett and Judd (1983) assume nonsequential search with ‡exible sample size. Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) and Janssen et al. (2005) relax the assumption of a free …rst price quote.
1 2 The commuters' search cost is mainly a …xed cost. This is the cost of processing the information (station characteristics and prices displayed) and recalling the best deal. Tourists'search costs, instead, are characterized by a positive marginal cost. An extra search implies the need to …nd a gas station nearby and the potential cost of driving back to the station with the lowest price.
the empirical implications of nonsequential search models. 13;14 The empirical predictions from sequential search models are very similar to the nonsequential search case. 15 Our model builds on Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983) . Its simplicity allows us to focus on the e¤ect of heterogeneous search costs on price dispersion, and examine how the market search intensity adjusts to changes in the parameters of the model. A limitation is that it abstracts from the interaction between imperfect information and product di¤erentiation. As will be argued in the empirical part of the paper, our only assumption on this point is that the main equilibrium property, i.e. mixed strategies, is present when products are heterogeneous. Additionally, we avoid the common assumption that product characteristics imply a shift in prices and hence that the e¤ects of product di¤erentiation can be removed by demeaning the observed prices with …rm …xed e¤ects.
Assume a homogeneous good market with n …rms that compete on prices and have the same constant unit production cost c. The demand side is characterized by a unit mass of consumers that have inelastic demands with valuations v. 16 A fraction 2 (0; 1) of them have zero search cost and are called shoppers while the rest face positive -and di¤erent-search costs: Nonshoppers decide, before observing any price, between paying the search cost to know all the market prices or remaining ignorant and buying from a random store. 17 Two conditions need to be satis…ed in equilibrium: a) For any given search intensity 2 [0; 1], the pricing strategies of the …rms must be a Nash Equilibrium, and b) the search intensity in the market has to be consistent with the …rms'pricing strategies. That is, when consumers compare the cost of search with the bene…ts of search, they anticipate correctly the …rms'pricing strategies. Varian (1980) showed that, given a proportion of informed consumers ; there is a unique symmetric NE that involves …rms playing mixed strategies. In each period, …rms simultaneously draw prices from
(1) 1 3 Additionally, the availability of gas prices for GPS, wireless phone and Internet users makes nonsequential search an increasingly likely protocol for both types of consumers. 1 4 Houde (2009) provides evidence of the importance of commuters for estimating demand in this market. 1 5 We describe the predictions of sequential search models in a supplementary note to this paper which is available from the authors'webpage. 1 6 This is a simplifying assumption and the results in this section hold for a large set of downward slopping demand functions. 1 7 The model is similar to Tappata (2009) and related to Armstrong et al. (2008) . The latter assumes that the number of prices observed by each informed consumer is a random variable instead of the full sample.
where p 2 [p = cn +(1 )v 1+(n 1) ; v]. For prices below p (c; v; n), a …rm always prefers to charge a monopoly price and sell to (1 ) =n consumers. The amount of search is directly related to the intensity of price competition. As the number of informed consumers increases, the domain of the price distribution increases and in the limit, the entire distribution collapses to the marginal cost (competitive outcome). At the other extreme, when no consumer searches, each …rm becomes a monopolist over 1=n consumers and the domain collapses to p = v (monopoly outcome). As Varian pointed out, the main implication of imperfect information is that prices are dispersed across sellers and across time. The latter is due to the fact that …rms draw new prices every period to keep consumers guessing as to which …rms are having sales.
The second requirement for an equilibrium is that the amount of search in the market needs to be consistent with the …rms'pricing strategies. That is, each consumer calculates the gains from search (GS) anticipating (1) and taking the market search intensity as given:
It is easy to see that GS is a non-monotonic function of the search intensity. There is no point in searching in the monopoly and competitive cases ( = 0 and = 1). In fact, the gains from search are low when very few or too many consumers decide to search, but are greater when the search intensity takes intermediate values. Tappata There is a unique equilibrium represented by the intersection of the two curves. It can be seen that as the number of …rms increases in the market, the search cost of the indi¤erent consumer is higher, implying a greater search intensity in more atomistic markets. to predict the search intensity or level of competition in a market. 19 To see this, de…ne b as the search intensity that maximizes GS for a given production cost and number of …rms. 20 The relationship between the search intensity and price dispersion is positive when < b and negative if > b : Therefore, comparing the price dispersion for products with di¤erent search costs does not answer the question of whether the dispersion is consistent with consumer search, since any relation -positive, negative or even zero -between consumers' search costs and price dispersion will be consistent with a model of consumer search. Instead, it provides the answer to the following question: Given that price dispersion is generated by consumer search, is the equilibrium search intensity consistent with prices closer to the competitive level or closer to the monopoly level? That is, by examining the price dispersion for products with di¤erent search costs, we can identify whether we are at the point in the relationship where increases in the search intensity increase price dispersion
. Below, we analyze how changes in the number of …rms, production cost and consumer search cost a¤ect the equilibrium price dispersion and price levels.
To examine the e¤ect of entry and exit, assume …rst that the search intensity is exogenous ( = ). Then, as the number of …rms in the market increases, the expected pro…t of a seller changes in two ways. First, the fraction of captive uninformed consumers for each …rm decreases at a rate 1=n. Second, the probability of being the lowest price in the market decreases at an exponential rate. These two e¤ects imply that …rms become more likely to set extreme prices at the expense of middle-range prices. All else constant, the price dispersion increases with n (Figure 1.a) . Moreover, since the gains from setting low prices decrease at a faster rate than the gains from setting high prices, the price distribution shifts toward higher prices.
But the complete e¤ect of the number of …rms on price levels and dispersion needs to incorporate the reaction by consumers. Given that price dispersion increases with n, the marginal consumer will have a greater search cost in markets with more …rms. When < b , the higher search intensity strengthens the partial (and positive) e¤ect of the number of …rms on the price dispersion. When > b , the higher search intensity reduces this partial e¤ect although it never o¤sets it. However, the total e¤ect on the average posted price cannot be signed since more consumers searching push prices down. As shown in Figure   1 .b, the relationship between the average price and the number of …rms is not monotonic. 1 9 We use the term price dispersion to refer to GS, SR and SD. The predictions of this section involve GS although they are also expected to hold for SR and SD.
2 0 We show this visually in Figure 6 in Section 5. It is important to emphasize this result since previous work assumed that a unique testable implication of search models is a negative relationship between average prices and market concentration (Barron et al 2004; and Lewis 2008) . Figure 1 .b also shows that the two alternative measures of price dispersion increase at a decreasing rate with n.
The comparative statics with respect to the production cost are straightforward. Holding the search intensity constant, as the cost of production increases, the gap between the monopoly price and the minimum pro…table price p decreases and …rms set higher but less dispersed prices (the extreme case being c = p = ). 21 Given the search intensity, the cost pass-through is lower than 100% and increases with . Figure 2 shows -for any given level of search intensity-the negative e¤ect of production cost on GS and markups.
With endogenous search the response by consumers to an increase in production cost is to search less. Thus, the new equilibrium involves higher and less dispersed prices. The …nal e¤ect on markups depends on the magnitude of the search intensity adjustment. In general, it is expected to be negative but it is possible that a large reduction in consumer search generates an equilibrium pass-through greater than 100%.
The last comparative static is about changes in the search cost. Higher search costs can be thought of as a decrease in the number of shoppers or as a change in the distribution of search costs such that the new distribution of search costs is …rst-order stochastically dominated by G (s). In both cases it is easy to see that the equilibrium search intensity is reduced and therefore prices increase. But, as mentioned above, the price dispersion will increase or decrease depending on the initial equilibrium ( Q b ). In Section 5 we use the price dispersion observed in the data for each fuel-type to …nd the equilibrium relationship between search intensity and price dispersion. Since gas stations sell three 2 1 It can be shown that GS decrease linearly in c (Tappata, 2009) .
First (second) parentheses corresponds to <b ( >b ) ( ) refers to exogenous (endogenous) search =+ implies that the relationship is non-monotonic Table 1 : Local comparative statics fuel-types that are associated with di¤erent search costs, we can obtain the e¤ect of search cost on price dispersion controlling for all other possible factors that a¤ect pricing decisions (see Figure 6 ). Table 1 summarizes the three comparative statics predicted by the model. 22 The entries in columns 2 and 3 show the qualitative and partial e¤ect of an increase in the parameters n and c on the expected price, price dispersion and markup. As discussed earlier, some of these comparative statics become non-monotonic once we allow consumers to adjust their search strategies to changes in the number of …rms or production costs (columns 4 and 5).
The last two columns show the e¤ect of an increase in the search cost (a change in G or a reduction in the number of shoppers).
We use this stylized model to claim that identi…cation of information frictions in the market cannot be based on estimating the relationships between the number of …rms and prices, or between the search costs/bene…ts and price dispersion. We propose a simple and more general test to assess the importance of search in the gasoline market. The test is related to the temporal price dispersion and looks at changes in relative prices over time since mixed strategies are a feature common to most consumer search models. We shall return, in Section 5, to analyzing the comparative static predictions of our model, when we compare them to estimated results in the gasoline industry.
Data description
In this section we describe the dataset that we use for the empirical analysis and present some descriptive statistics which help to understand the scope of the data and the nature of the retail gasoline market.
Our dataset is unique in the sense that it covers more cross-sectional observations and a higher temporal frequency than the data used in other studies of this nature. We obtained daily gasoline prices for virtually every gas station in the states of California, Florida, Texas and New Jersey. Moreover, our sample time period stretches for almost 18 months (January
2006-May 2007). 23
The data were originally collected by OPIS (Oil Price Information Service) and are widely available through various commercial and other organizations. OPIS provides daily service station level data for up to 120,000 stations across the US, which translates to more than 25,000 stations in the four states that we analyze. 24;25 The prices are obtained from "reconciled credit card transactions, direct feeds of data and other survey methods"
(opisnet.com). The data are from all kinds of service stations: company owned, jobber owned, or independently owned. We have data on all three grades of unleaded gasolineRegular, Mid-grade and Premium -as well as Diesel, although not every station sells all fuel-types or necessarily reports a price on each day for all fuel-types. Each observation is a station-date-fuel-type triple. We dropped some observations which could not be geocoded;
either because their addresses were ambiguous, or because the geocoding software could not …nd a match with a high enough degree of accuracy.
A second dataset includes weekday spot prices from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the ports relevant to the states that we analyze: Los Angeles Harbor, New
York Harbor and the Gulf Coast. Depending on the vertical contract with the re…nery, a gas station buys its gasoline in the wholesale market at the rack price or obtains it directly from the re…nery at the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price which is private and includes delivery to the station. Since we do not observe data on rack or DTW prices we use the spot price as a proxy for the shifts in the wholesale cost faced by stations. Figure 7 in the Appendix plots monthly spot, rack and DTW prices and shows that they are almost perfectly correlated. In particular, the spot and rack prices behave very similarly (average spread is less than 1 cent and the correlation is above 0.99). 26 We now present summary statistics on our dataset. Data on raw prices are not very meaningful due to considerable variation across time in the price of crude oil. The second panel presents averages of the 'markup'which is de…ned here as the retail price minus the corresponding spot price on that date. 27 This measure exhibits considerably less variation. As noted above, this value includes taxes and other state and county speci…c price di¤erences. Nevertheless, it provides a better picture of the variation in prices according to fuel-types and states.
The third and fourth panels of Table 2 contain data on the number of rival gas stations that surround a given station. For example, the average gas station in Texas has 4.74 other stations within a 1 mile radius, whereas the average Diesel-selling station in that state has just 1.2 other stations (that also sell Diesel) in the same radius. 28 Despite the di¤erences in the price levels, the station density in each market is similar across states. 29 Appendix Table 13 shows the distribution of gasoline brands in the dataset. There is considerable variation across states in the shares of various brands. However the larger brands, such as Shell, Chevron, Citgo and Mobil are observed across all states and unbranded stations account for between 6 and 10 percent of the observed stations. 30 Our empirical strategy in Section 5 will rely on estimating the e¤ect on price dispersion of varying market conditions, as well as varying levels of costs. In order to accurately represent the competitive environment in this industry, we de…ne each gas station as lying in a unique market. This comprises the station itself, plus all the stations that lie within a certain radius. This implies that each station will be counted as being part of many distinct markets. A similar approach has been taken in other work in this industry. 31 Although the frequency of our gasoline pricing data is at the daily level, we do not observe prices posted by every station on every date. To avoid making any assumptions regarding missing data, we rede…ne markets according to each date in our dataset in the 2 7 We compute this measure for Regular Unleaded and Diesel only; the spot price of the higher grade gasoline fuels is the same as for Regular. The markup is not intended to measure the actual pro…t per gallon for retailers but rather the variability of retail prices net of the wholesale cost volatility. following way. Any gas station reporting a price on a given date is the center of a potential market. The entire market will consist of that station on that date, along with all the stations which fall within a certain radius, and which also report prices on that same date.
Therefore, each market corresponds to a particular date. We restrict markets to contain 3 or more stations.
To study price dispersion in a given market -that is, in the set of stations de…ned by one central station on a particular date and all other stations falling within a speci…ed radius of the original station and reporting prices on the same date -we calculate three statistics: The standard deviation of prices reported by these stations, the range of prices (i.e. maximum price minus minimum price), and the gains from search in these markets.
The last statistic is de…ned in Equation 2. Table 3 contains summary statistics of price dispersion at the market level. The radius used to de…ne markets in Table 3 was 1 mile; in Appendix Table 12 we present summary statistics on markets de…ned according to a 2-mile radius. price series for California obtained from the EIA. 32 As is widely known, gasoline prices peak in the summer months and reach their lowest point around January. Also, our sample of prices for California very closely tracks the o¢ cial price average for that state, which provides reassurance that our sample is representative. The …gures for the other states also match the o¢ cial averages very closely, and are not presented here.
It is worth emphasizing the richness and detail that our dataset provides. By having daily station level data, we are able to examine local market price dispersion for all states and fuel-types over time, without having to rely on samples which are not always representative along these dimensions. The main empirical prediction from consumer search models is 
Temporal price dispersion
In this section we try to answer the following question: Is price dispersion in the gasoline industry consistent with a search based theory of sales? In order to do this, we look at the properties of price dispersion over time. Dispersed prices can be the outcome of both product heterogeneity and costly consumer search. However, a critical di¤erence between the two is that prices are not expected to change in product di¤erentiation models as long as the characteristics of the products remain constant. 34 By contrast, models of consumer search including the one presented in Section 2 predict temporal price dispersion (sales) since …rms use mixed strategies and change their prices every period to to keep buyers from learning about the identity of the store with the lowest price.
A straightforward way to analyze temporal dispersion is to look at the changes in the 3 3 For examples, see Barron et al (2004) , Hosken et al (2008) , and Lewis (2008) . 3 4 The equilibrium in these type of models is characterized by …rms using pure strategies. 
We construct this statistic for all possible pairs of stations separated by less than 2 miles. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the rank reversals for Regular Unleaded gasoline and Table 4 presents the summary statistics for all fuel-types and distance bounds of 1 and 2 miles. Both suggest the existence of temporal price dispersion: more than 90% of the pairs of stations have positive rank reversals and the average rank reversal is around 0.15 (Regular and Mid-grade Unleaded). That means that a station that usually charges the lower price has a higher price 15% of the time. 35 The table also shows that the average price spread between two gas stations is not negligible (more than 5 cents per gallon) and that this spread increases with the octane rating, suggesting that the intensity of price competition is di¤erent across fuel-types. We return to this point in the next Section.
The rank reversals statistic conveys information that is similar to the transition probabilities calculated in other studies of price dispersion. For example, Lewis (2008 ), Hosken et al. (2008 , and Lach and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) …nd evidence of mixed strategiesand hence consumer search -in the gasoline market by noting that the probability that that some or all of these factors are behind the rank reversals in Figure 4 and Table 4 . To test whether imperfect information is also responsible for the observed price dispersion, the ideal study would entail comparing price dispersion in markets where the researcher knows that search is absent (a control group), with the dispersion in markets where search could be present.
The nature of the gasoline retailing market allows for such a test. Since gas prices are prominently posted outside stations and visible to all drivers, we expect that the price spread between gas stations that are located in the same street intersection re ‡ect only product di¤erences. Stations in the same corner set di¤erent prices according to their heterogeneity (brand, amenities, accessibility, etc.) but they do not compete among each other for informed or uninformed consumers since every driver in that corner knows their prices. 39 However, these stations located in the same corner might choose their prices to compete for informed consumers with other distant stations and then distribute their captive customers based on product di¤erences. 40 In other words, rank reversals are expected to happen less frequently for stations that are close to each other than for stations that are further apart but still in the same market.
Assume that the rank reversals between stations in the same corner are drawn from the distribution F 1 (r) and that the rank reversals between the stations that are separated by more than a block but still in the same market (1 mile or 2 miles) are drawn from F 2 (r) : If consumer search plays an important role in the gasoline market, we should expect F 1 (r) > F 2 (r). We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to evaluate whether the observed rank reversals for the two groups are drawn from the same population. This is a non parametric test that evaluates the alternative hypothesis of F 1 ? F 2 ; against the null hypothesis H 0 : Figure 5 shows the empirical distribution of rank reversals for Regular unleaded gasoline and Table 5 presents the test results for the four fuel-types and the two market bound speci…cations. Except in the case of Premium gasoline, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% signi…cance level. 41 That is, consistent with the theory, the temporal price dispersion is signi…cantly lower for the control group than at the market level.
Analogous results can be obtained in a regression environment. Running an OLS regression of the number of rank reversals between any two pairs of stations, on an indicator variable for whether these are in the same corner, and other control variables would only provide a test for the equality of the means of the dependent variable for each of the two groups, i.e. station-pairs in the same corner, and those that are not. However, our hypothesis is that the entire distribution of rank reversals among pairs of stations at the same 3 9 See Png and Reitman (1994) for evidence of product di¤erentiation across stations with similar location. 4 0 Note that we are implicitly assuming some degree of coordination between …rms located at the same intersection. In terms of the model of Section 2, only one station draws a price and the rest adjust their prices based on product characteristics. 4 1 We will return to the topic of Premium gasoline in Section 5. 
where I[corner] is an indicator for whether stations i and j are in the same corner, and X contains other control variables.
OLS and Quantile regression results of estimating equation 3 are presented in Table 6 .
We only report the coe¢ cient on the variable of interest, namely the indicator for being in the same corner. The results strongly indicate that pairs of gas stations at the same corner have fewer rank reversals, over time, than pairs that are further apart. This parametric test bears out the previous results using the non-parametric K-S test and supports our hypothesis that search is important in the gasoline market.
Note that the rank reversals for stations in the same corners are far from zero ( Figure   5 ). This could be related to measurement errors since we consider stations to be in the same corner when their distance is below 80 meters (270 feet). 44 The reason is that even when street addresses are correct in our database, the mapping into latitude and longitude
coordinates is not precise and therefore distances calculated for the stations can be easily overstated. On the other hand, stations that we assign to the same corner could actually be further apart. This last e¤ect might explain why rank reversals are not zero at corners.
As mentioned above, many reasons besides product di¤erentiation and search can explain di¤erences in prices between two gas stations. First, stations could di¤er in their 4 2 Results for the quantiles lower than 15% are generally not identi…ed as there are a signi…cant number of pairs of stations with zero rank reversals, regardless of their distance from each other.
4 3 The Figure 5 . 47 Third, stations could face demand shocks and hence adjust their prices relative to other 4 5 There is evidence that …nal prices are not a¤ected by the vertical relations between stations and re…ners. Hastings (2004) studied the acquisition of the independent gasoline retail chain Thrifty by ARCO in Southern California and …nds that the observed increment in prices after the merger was due to the independents' lower market share and not a consequence of the change in contracts (from no integration to partial and full integration). On the other hand, Shepard (1993) …nds that the contract choice is mainly motivated by agency costs associated with the characteristics of di¤erent stations.
…rms that did not receive a demand shock. In general, a demand shock should be thought of as a¤ecting a whole market rather than a particular gas station or corner. Thus, if demand shocks explained rank reversals we would observe that gas stations in the same market (1 or 2 miles apart) have lower reversals than those further apart. The K-S test was used (not reported) to test this prediction and we …nd some evidence of market demand shocks. In the case of Regular unleaded, the rank reversals for pairs of stations located in the same market (1 mile) are lower than for stations separated by more than 2 miles. However, this di¤erence disappears once we consider a market bound of 2 miles or other fuel-types. Additionally, to explain the di¤erences in rank reversals between the control and treatment groups we need to consider the possibility of localized demand shocks such as sport and other events. To correct for that, only weekday prices were used to calculate the rank reversals.
Fourth, it could be argued that some station owners set prices based on the accounting rather than opportunity cost of gasoline. If this is the case, rank reversals could simply arise because station …ll their underground storage tanks at di¤erent moments. Despite the doubts about the rationality of this behavior, we carry out the same test of rank reversals but restricting the observations to those for which both prices in the station pair change with respect to the last reported prices. 48 Table 15 in the Appendix shows that the results are even stronger (including Premium gasoline) than those obtained when prices are not conditioned to change.
Last, rank reversals can be consistent with Edgeworth Cycles, a price pattern generated by …rms taking turns to change their prices. 49 We do not discard this as a possible explanation for positive rank reversals at the market level; however this would require two cycles occurring in parallel (one at the intersections and one in the entire market of 1-mile radius) with the properties shown in Table 5 . Moreover, Table 15 in the Appendix provides evidence that reversals in the two groups are still signi…cantly di¤erent when …rms are changing their prices simultaneously rather than in turns.
To summarize this section, our results establish the link between consumer search theory and the price dispersion observed in gasoline markets. By employing a simple test involving street corners, we are able to compare pairs of stations which may be randomizing their prices, in order to keep consumers uninformed, to pairs of stations where imperfect information is not a consideration in determining relative prices. Our results strongly indicate 4 8 Evidence that current practices are to set prices according to the opportunity cost can be inferred from Connecticut Senate Bill 1136 that attempts to "mandate that retailers sell gasoline based on the actual prices . . . paid for the gasoline located in underground storage tanks located on the premises of the retail gasoline station at which gasoline is sold," (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/05/fyi07241.shtm) 4 9 Evidence of Edgeworth Cycles in the gasoline market has been found for some Canadian cities (Eckert, 2003; and Noel, 2007Noel, 2007b) . The evidence in the US is not as clear (Hosken et al, 2008) .
that, on top of other possible mechanisms, costly consumer search plays an important role in explaining the observed variation of prices. We emphasize again that it is the nature of the gasoline industry, and the nature of our panel dataset, that allow us to conduct this test.
Regression Results
The results of the previous section suggested that imperfect information plays an important role in generating temporal price dispersion. We now present additional empirical exercises.
We have two main goals in this section. First, we characterize the equilibrium relationships between price dispersion and key parameters that vary both cross-sectionally and temporally. We compare our estimates to the predictions of our stylized search model of Section 2; refer to Table 1 for these predictions.
Second, we attempt to pin down the equilibrium relationship between price dispersion and search intensity. Recall, from Section 2, that examining the relationship between price dispersion and measures of search bene…ts or costs does not lead to identi…cation of the role of search in generating price dispersion. Rather, a test of this nature helps to pin down whether the observed equilibrium is closer to the competitive outcome or the monopoly outcome, given that imperfect information a¤ects pricing behavior. We will use our data on gasoline prices for di¤erent fuel-types to analyze this issue.
We now present results from estimating regressions of price dispersion at the market level on measures of cost and average market prices. Our basic estimation strategy relies on estimating the relationship between price dispersion in a market and (i) the spot price of gasoline or diesel, which serves as a measure of the input cost of gas stations and (ii) characteristics of the market such as the average level of prices. Recall, from Section 3 that a market is de…ned as a central station on a given date surrounded by all stations within a speci…ed radius that report prices on the same date.
Our baseline speci…cation is:
where P RICEDISP jt denotes various measures of price dispersion in market j on date t, M C t is a measure of the marginal cost faced by gas stations on date t, and AV P RICE jt is the average retail price of all gas stations in market j on date t. Note that M C is not market speci…c whereas AV P RICE is. 50 Table 7 . We have combined observations across all 4 states, for each fuel-type, with state-…xed e¤ects included. Our measure of marginal cost is the same-day spot price of the wholesale market corresponding to the state.
The results show that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. These results are strongly signi…cant (p-value less than 0.01) and hold across all fuel-types, except for Premium. Moreover, the results are robust to running the regression state-by-state; we do not report the individual states' results here. Below, we discuss the reasons for Premium gasoline not exhibiting the same results as for the other fuel-types. The …rst result implies that shocks to the spot price of gasoline (or diesel) are associated with a decrease in price dispersion. The range of prices for Regular Unleaded decreases by about 5% of the increase in the spot price. This is consistent with the notion that an increase in the input cost (and, therefore, the retail price) of gasoline across all markets leads to a decrease in price dispersion and, consequently, a decrease in the search intensity of consumers.
The second result implies that markets with higher retail prices for gasoline or diesel are associated with higher price dispersion, holding all else constant (in particular, the market spot price). There may be various reasons for this e¤ect; for example, product di¤erentiation or varying search intensities by consumers across markets. However, this result is also consistent with the notion that lower levels of consumer search, for idiosyncratic reasons on the demand side, and which we associate with higher levels of retail prices, lead to increased price dispersion, for all > b , as discussed in Section 2. We do not have a direct explanation of which kind of markets experience lower search intensity. One possible explanation could be through income, however we do not …nd that markets located in zip-codes with higher income have higher price dispersion. 51 Note, however, that the income of the residents of the market area does not necessarily correspond to the income of its customers, since these 5 1 We assigned zip-code level data on income from the 2000 US Census for this purpose.
could be commuters, for example. 52 The income of the true customers would be a useful explanatory variable. We will return to the discussion of the interpretation of 2 below.
The regression above uses the contemporaneous spot price as a measure of the input cost of stations. However, in reality, it may take some time for shocks to the spot price to be re ‡ected in the input prices at retail gas stations. 53 Accordingly, we ran a speci…cation with spot price in the above regression replaced by various measures of lagged spot prices.
The results (not reported) are unchanged, indicating a negative and strongly signi…cant e¤ect of lagged spot prices on price dispersion. Rather than searching for the optimal lag structure, we replace the contemporaneous or lagged spot prices in the above regressions with the contemporaneous state-wide average retail price for the corresponding fuel-type on that date. This strategy assumes that shocks to the spot price will, ultimately, be re ‡ected in the retail prices of all gas stations, after the appropriate time has elapsed. The regression therefore becomes:
Before presenting the results of this regression, it is important to be clear on the sources of identi…cation. We would like to identify the e¤ect of market speci…c factors (re ‡ected in the market average price) separate from date speci…c factors (re ‡ected in the statewide average price on that date). A reasonable question is whether prices in narrowly de…ned markets di¤er signi…cantly from the statewide average. In Appendix Table 16 , we show that they do. The table presents summary measures on the variable M jt , de…ned as the di¤erence, for each market, between the average price in the market and the average price in the state on the date corresponding to the market: M jt = AV P RICE jt ST AT EAV ERAGE t . Clearly, there is substantial variation in this variable. Market average prices can di¤er by 30 to 40 cents per gallon from the contemporaneous state average. Looking across percentiles, there appears to be greater variation in Mid-grade and Premium gasoline compared to Regular. The second column under each fuel-type in Table 7 includes the number of stations in the market. In particular, we include the number of stations located within 1 mile of the central station in order to control for market structure characteristics. 54 Doing so does not change the signs or signi…cance of the estimates of 1 and 2 . Moreover the e¤ect of the number of …rms is positive and strongly signi…cant, suggesting that an additional gas station is associated with an average increase in the range of prices of around 0.4 cents.
Once again, these results hold across all states and fuel-types, and are robust to using the number of …rms in a 2 mile radius. The interpretation of this result is that, as the number of …rms increases, there is an increasing tendency towards more extreme pricing. A …rm that tries to undercut all its rivals now needs to set a lower price on average; whereas if …rms choose not to set low prices to attract informed consumers then they will choose to be at the upper end of the distribution of prices in order to maximize margins. Therefore, the domain from which …rms draw prices increases and so does any measure of price dispersion, holding constant the search intensity. In equilibrium, the search intensity also adjusts, as consumers …nd it more attractive to search, but the …nal result is generally higher price dispersion (see Figure 2 .a).
The average price dispersion (range) for Premium is 43% larger than for Regular (and 27% larger than Mid-grade). 55 Except in the case of cars that require higher octane fuel, the Figure 6 : Consumer search cost and equilibrium search intensity demand for Premium is comprised of those who believe this grade will not hurt the engine, even if the car does not explicitly require it. This insurance motive can be expected to be stronger for people driving expensive cars which should be correlated with higher income and search costs. 56 If this assumption is correct, we would expect the price dispersion for higher octane grades to be lower (higher) than for Regular when the search intensity is low (high). This can be seen in Figure 6 .
Note that the non-monotonic relationship between price dispersion and search intensity does not, in general, permit the identi…cation of the local equilibrium. In principle, it is possible for the relationship between price dispersion and search to be negative. However, combining our assumption regarding search costs -namely that search costs are highest for Premium gasoline, followed by Mid-grade and then Regular -and the observed result that price dispersion follows this same ordering, we can pin down the location of the current equilibrium: it is on the downward sloping portion of the function in Figure 6 . Thus, our results suggest that the gasoline market is closer to the competitive outcome than to the monopoly outcome and the relationship between search intensity and price dispersion is negative. 57 We can also conclude that the market for Regular gasoline is the most competitive, followed by Mid-grade and then Premium.
The traditional approach in the empirical literature has been to work with "cleaned prices" rather than actual or raw prices. That is, the analysis is focused on the price dispersion that remains after product characteristics are controlled for. We now follow this approach and construct our dispersion measures with the estimated residuals from a 5 6 See Setiawan and Sperling (1993) for details. The authors show that Premium gasoline is a luxury good, whose demand falls as average gasoline prices rise. They also show that the propensity to buy Premium is positively correlated with consumers'income.
5 7 This is consistent with the …ndings by Sorensen (2000) in the prescription drug market, and Brown and Goolsbee (2000) in the insurance market once the Internet became a widespread method of search. 58 In Section 4 we had mentioned the problem of using cleaned prices for identifying consumer search. Once search is established, the problems are not so severe. However, note that this exercise makes certain assumptions about the interaction between product di¤erentiation and imperfect information, namely that they are additively separable. 59 If these variables interact in a di¤erent way then using residuals does not correct for product di¤erentiation, and in fact it would be preferable to examine actual prices rather than demeaned prices. With this caveat in mind, we present estimates in Table 9 from regressions of dispersion in the market level residuals on the state average residual and the market average residual.
The estimates con…rm our earlier results. Controlling for station characteristics, increases in the statewide average price decrease price dispersion, while increases in the market average price and the number of …rms increase price dispersion. In fact, our results are stronger using residuals than actual prices: they hold across all states and fuel-types.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient on Premium gasoline is …nally similar, in sign and magnitude, to those for the other fuel-types, unlike our previous results. This may suggest that product di¤erentiation plays a greater role in explaining prices and price dispersion for this grade of gasoline; but that once station characteristics are controlled for, the e¤ect of state and market average prices are the same as for the other grades. 60 5 8 Gasoline stations di¤erentiate themselves along many dimensions: location, accessibility, brand, the number of fueling stations, the presence of a car wash or a convenience store etc.
5 9 To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical work that analyzes the testable predictions of general models that incorporate the interaction of product di¤erentiation and consumer search. See Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) and Wildenbeest (2008?) for particular examples of models with vertical di¤erentiation and consumer search.
6 0 As can be seen in Table 4 , the average di¤erence between two gas stations selling Premium gasoline is more than twice the di¤erence for Regular. This may explain why our rank reversals test in Section 4 was One concern with our methodology so far may be that we assign a single price observation -that is, a station-date combination -to many di¤erent, overlapping, markets and therefore to many regressions. This implies that there is a high degree of correlation in the regressors and, potentially, the unobserved component, in each regression. A strategy to address this issue would involve identifying distinct, non-overlapping markets, and examining whether the results are sensitive to our de…nition of a market. 61 Accordingly, we identify, separately for each date, markets according to our original de…nition, but subject to the constraint that no station is assigned to more than one market. In particular, we restrict the set of markets to have central stations that are at least 2 miles away from the central station of any other market (recall that the market radius is restricted to 1 mile, which ensures that no station will be counted more than once on any day). Doing so leaves us with approximately 30% to 50% of the original markets depending on the fuel-type.
The results with the Range as the dependent variable, using only these markets, and using residuals rather than actual prices, are presented in Table 10 . The results are very similar to previous speci…cations.
We now examine the coe¢ cient on the number of …rms more closely. Every speci…cation thus far has indicated that markets with more …rms have greater price dispersion, which is the result that our theoretical model predicted. Recall again that we are not claiming a causal interpretation of this result; for example it could be that markets with greater price slightly weaker (though still signi…cant at 95%) for Premium than for the other fuel-types. 6 1 Other possible corrections for this issue involve panel speci…cations using market …xed e¤ects, as well as clustering standard errors at the market level. We ran all of these tests and found very similar results, with every coe¢ cient of interest remaining signi…cant at the 99% level. Results from these speci…cations are available from the authors. dispersion attract entry. Nevertheless, our results are consistent across speci…cations, and robust to using di¤erent measures of price dispersion, such as the gains from search and the standard deviation of prices, as well as to di¤erent market de…nitions. In other results (not reported), we used the number of stations in a 2 mile radius and continued to …nd a positive and strongly signi…cant relation between the number of …rms and price dispersion. 62 Our theoretical model implied that an increase in the number of …rms in the market would increase price dispersion, but at a decreasing rate (see Figure 2 .b). Allowing a quadratic speci…cation for the number of stations, we …nd the e¤ect is indeed concave and in fact quite similar to the e¤ect predicted by our model. A plot of the relation between the number of gas stations within a 1 mile radius and the range of prices, using our estimated coe¢ cients, looks very similar to the relation predicted by our theoretical model. The estimates were obtained using the sample of stations selling Regular Unleaded, in nonoverlapping markets, and using residuals instead of prices. 63 The theory suggests that higher production costs can have either a positive or negative e¤ect on …rms' markups, once consumer search is endogenized (see Figure 2 ). This is independent of the e¤ect on price dispersion, which has an unambiguously negative relationship with production costs. In order to test this, we examine the relation between average markups and the spot price. In particular, we calculate
dc , where c is the contemporaneous spot price and p is the posted retail price. We also introduce the number of rival stations to examine the e¤ect of this variable on …rm markups.
Our regression speci…cation is therefore:
Our dependent variable is now at the …rm level, rather than at the market level. We are unable to calculate direct measures of the markup since we do not have daily data on Rack or DTW prices. However, as argued in Section 3, the spot price is a good indicator of wholesale cost shifters for gas stations since it is highly correlated with their actual input prices. Moreover, if the price at the terminal consists of a constant markup over the spot price, then our regression coe¢ cients will be exactly the same as if we had data on the actual terminal price. Note also that gasoline and diesel have distinct spot prices, which we observe. We also have separate data on spot prices by state. We include state …xed e¤ects in the regressions to account for state speci…c di¤erences in prices, due to factors such as taxes or regulatory standards. Regression results are presented in Table 11 . The …rst four columns present results, separately for Diesel and Regular Unleaded, using posted prices to construct markups. The next four columns use demeaned prices instead, which allows us to examine the e¤ect of spot prices on markups holding constant factors such as location and brand which are associated with product di¤erentiation. The sample was constructed using stations at the center of the non-overlapping markets de…ned above. The number of rivals for a given …rm is de…ned using a 1 mile radius; the results are very similar using a 2 mile radius instead.
The results of Table 11 imply that …rm markups are lower when contemporaneous spot prices are higher. This suggests that the reaction by consumers to lower price dispersion -caused by the increase in …rms'costs -is not enough to o¤set the direct negative e¤ect on …rms' markups. A 10 cent increase in the spot price reduces the average markup by 1.4 cents for Regular gasoline and by almost 3 cents for Diesel. This also implies that the market for Regular gasoline is considerably more competitive than for Diesel. Again, these results hold for each state individually. The results also seem to imply that markets with more stations have lower markups. In any case, including the number of rival stations does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on the spot price. 64 We now summarize the results of this section. We have shown that observed price dispersion is positively associated with the number of …rms in the market and negatively associated with measures of …rms'marginal costs. The results relating market structure to price dispersion are counter to those found by Barron et al (2004) , but similar to the results found by Lach and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) and by Lewis (2008) for local sub markets. The results relating production cost to price dispersion are, to our knowledge, new as data used in previous studies have not spanned as long a period as ours (18 months), which permits an examination of this issue. Our results indicate that there are lower gains from search as the average price of gasoline rises. Thus consumers would be better o¤ reducing their search intensity during periods of high oil prices. Note that all the results -with cleaned or actual prices -are consistent with the predictions of our model of endogenous search with homogeneous products from Section 2. This may help to establish the desired properties for a more general model that incorporates product di¤erentiation and costly consumer search.
Our model also predicted a non-monotonic relationship between price dispersion and measures of search intensity. While we cannot directly measure search intensity, we use two plausible measures to show that, at the current equilibrium, there is a negative relationship between these variables, implying that the equilibrium is closer to the competitive outcome than the monopoly outcome. This was done by showing that markets with higher average prices, suggesting lower search intensity by consumers, have greater price dispersion. Additionally, products that we believe are associated with higher search costs exhibit greater price dispersion. All of our results are robust to many di¤erent speci…cations.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine the role of imperfect information in explaining equilibrium price dispersion. We use a theoretical model of endogenous consumer search to show that identi…cation of the role of imperfect information cannot be done by simply testing the usual comparative statics of price dispersion on search costs or bene…ts, or the number of …rms in the market. Price dispersion and …rms'mark-ups become non-monotonic functions of those variables once we allow consumers to adjust their equilibrium search strategies. Previous work has often assumed that these relationships are indeed monotonic and has accordingly inferred consumer search from positive or negative relationships among these variables. We argue that identifying the role of consumer search in explaining price dispersion requires examining temporal dispersion, a dimension in which predictions from consumer search models and other models are orthogonal. Using a novel test of rank reversals, we …nd that the temporal price dispersion at the market level is consistently higher that at the corner level. This is consistent with the theory of consumer search since the dispersion in the latter group is driven only by product di¤erentiation.
We then use a unique panel dataset to examine equilibrium price dispersion in the U.S.
retail gasoline industry. We verify that increases in production costs are associated with a decrease in price dispersion. In particular, a 10 cent increase in the statewide average price of Regular Unleaded gasoline decreases price dispersion by between 2 to 4 cents. The number of stations in the market is positively related to price dispersion; on average one additional gas station within a market of a 1 mile radius increases price dispersion within the market by almost 4 cents. The results for station markups also conform to our theoretical predictions. A 10 cent increase in the spot price of gasoline is associated with up to a 2 cent decrease in gas stations'markups. Our …ndings are similar across all fuel-types, and hold across all states. All our results are robust to using actual prices or prices net of station …xed e¤ects. They are also robust to restricting attention to stations which are in markets that do not overlap. Our results are in line with the predictions of our simple model of endogenous search.
Our results imply that consumers could save as much as 5% by price shopping within a one-mile radius. The fact that search costs deter consumers from price-shopping is reinforced by the result that grades of gasoline associated with higher search costs involve greater price dispersion. To the extent that search costs act as a friction, sources that alleviate imperfect information will reduce prices and price dispersion. Centralized sources of information regarding gas prices would achieve this. Existing web sites where users periodically list stations'gas prices may be one step in this direction. 65 Moreover, our results indicate that price dispersion decreases when the aggregate level of prices rise, implying that there are less gains to searching at such times. Therefore, employing a policy of greater search during periods of peak pricing may be sub-optimal. Increased information along these lines may help consumers to make better decisions regarding their search strategies. 
